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 President Barack Obama’s health care reform bill has been both the most distinguishing 
footprint left by his administration and the most disputed.  As debates over the bill surge 
throughout the nation, many opponents have turned to a question of constitutionality to defeat 
the plan.  These critics of the bill use the Commerce Clause as their point of attack, while 
Obama’s supporters affirm the bill’s absolute compatibility with the clause and the Constitution.  
Today, federal courts are still divided over the issue, with four of the major appeals court 
decisions shedding little light on the overall judicial position on the law.1  Meanwhile, the bill 
has reached the Supreme Court, and much of the nation and probably all of its politicians will 
tune in to hear what the Justices have to say regarding the law’s constitutionality.   
 As the battle continues, strikingly few credible government officials or national leaders 
would even think to question the relevance of constitutionality in regards to health care reform.  
In this context, the debate over health care reform revolves around whether the bill is 
constitutional or unconstitutional, not about whether constitutionality is important.  If the 
Supreme Court strikes down the reform as unconstitutional, no one will dare say that it should be 
implemented anyway.  The treatment of the Constitution as a document of unmatched legal 
importance in American politics is a sentiment shared by the overwhelming majority and one 
                                                
1 Thomas More Law Center v. Obama (Jun. 29, 2011) – Court rules 2-1 in favor to uphold law.  
Florida v. United States Department of Health and Human Services (Aug 12, 2011) – 
Court rules 2-1 to strike down the individual mandate as beyond Congress’s constitutional 
authority.  Liberty University v. Geithner (Sep. 8, 2011) – Court rules 2-1 to defer 
consideration of law until 2015.  Seven-Sky v. Holder (Nov. 8, 2011) – Court rules 2-1 to 
uphold law as valid Congressional power to regulate Commerce.     
Rice, Lewis. "Is the Obama Health Care Reform Constitutional? Fried, Tribe and Barnett  debate 
the Affordable Care Act." Spotlight at Harvard Law School. Harvard Law School, 28 Mar. 
2011. Web. 21 Mar. 2012.   <http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/spotlight/constitutional-
law/is-obama-health-care-reform-constitutional.html>.  
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that has been around for hundreds of years.  But when was this sentiment born?  What created 
the unshakeable foundation for constitutional superiority that lives in American politics today?   
 The first truly monumental question of legislative constitutionality presented itself in the 
1791 National Bank debate.  The National Bank, as envisioned by Alexander Hamilton, 
Secretary of the Treasury at the time, was proposed to the First Congress in 1790.  His Second 
Report on Public Credit, which contained the Bank proposal, was one of three important works 
that unveiled Hamilton’s entire economic policy, along with the 1789 First Report on Public 
Credit and late 1791 Report on Manufactures.2  The First Report had argued that a funded debt 
(in this context, the American post-Revolutionary war debt) could be transformed into capital, 
and the Second Report recommended that this transformation be performed through a Bank.3  
Ultimately, Hamilton’s main objective in funding the debt through the incorporation of the Bank 
was to “stabilize the new national government and establish its credit.”  In other words, he aimed 
to ease the investment of private capital.  Hamilton’s more specific hopes revolved around 
ambitious entrepreneurs and their ability to give the American economy a significant push.  He 
predicted that the Bank would attract both foreign and domestic capital into the possession of 
these entrepreneurs, and the entrepreneurs would, in turn, invest the capital into the nation’s 
economic growth.  This sort of wealth concentration was imperative, Hamilton reasoned, in an 
underdeveloped frontier society like the US where manufactures were few, capital frequently 
diffused, and thus currency depleted.  Helping to eliminate these negative traits of the American 
economy, concentration and mobilization of capital would “excite the industry and productivity 
of the American people.”  Likewise, it would cure a chronically unfavorable balance of trade by 
                                                
2  Hamilton, Alexander. "Hamilton's Second Report on Public Credit." Select Documents 
Illustrative of the History of the United States 1776. By William MacDonald. N.p.: Ayer 
Publishing, 1969. 61-66. Google Books. Web. 21 Mar. 2012.  
3  Hamilton, Alexander. "Hamilton’s First Report on Public Credit." MacDonald 46-58.  
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encouraging export production.4  Finally, it would act as both a source of emergency loans and a 
depository of funds.5 
 Hamilton’s constitutional justification for the Bank derived from Article 1, Section 8, 
which gave Congress the power “to borrow Money on the credit of the United States.”  He 
reasoned that the Bank itself would supply these loans.  Although no explicit power allowed 
Congress to establish such a Bank, Hamilton looked to the Necessary and Proper Clause of 
Article 1, Section 8 for constitutional justification:  Congress would have the right “to make all 
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers,” 
which included the aforementioned power to borrow money.6   
 However, the Bank proposal met fierce opposition from Secretary of State Thomas 
Jefferson and Virginia Congressman James Madison.  Their criticisms revolved around two 
major points of contention:  They viewed the Bank as economically corrupt and unsound, and 
they viewed it as unconstitutional in the context of the Necessary and Proper Clause.    
 Madison found abundant economic flaws with the Bank bill.  He asserted two particular 
disadvantages in his 1791 speeches to Congress:  The Bank would abolish precious metals as the 
basis for currency by substituting another financial medium for them, and it would expose the 
American people to the risk of a run on the Bank.  Moreover, what troubled Madison even more 
was that these evils would be unleashed onto the public in the form of an eleven-year Bank 
                                                
4  McCoy, Drew R. "The Specter of Walpole." The Elusive Republic. Williamsburg: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1980. 147-148. Print.  
5 Staloff, Darren. "Alexander Hamilton: The Enlightenment Fulfilled." Hamilton, Adams, 
Jefferson. New York: Hill and Wang, 2005. 97. Print.  
6 Brookhiser, Richard. "The First Political Party." James Madison. New York: Basic Books, 
2011. 92. Print.  
 4 
charter, which was much too lengthy for his liking.7  Yet just like Jefferson, Madison aimed the 
majority of his publically voiced opposition to the Bank at its unconstitutionality.  He claimed 
that constitutionally granted Congressional power to borrow did not imply the power to charter a 
bank to make loans.8   
 For Jefferson, the Bank effectively represented the evils that he attributed to all banks of 
note issue (rather than gold issue).  Instead of helping people succeed, banks preyed on people, 
put them into debt, and supported luxury and extravagance.9  In short, banks did not create 
capital, as bank proponents claimed, rather they diverted it from virtuous agricultural pursuits10 
Ultimately however, Jefferson joined Madison in choosing the unconstitutionality of the Bank as 
his point of attack.  Claiming unconstitutionality, Jefferson complained that to treat the 
establishment of the Bank as an “implied” power with regard to the Necessary and Proper Clause 
was “to take possession of a boundless field of power, no longer susceptible of any definition” or 
restriction.11  He would commit to this argument throughout the National Bank Debate.     
 Hamilton’s response to Jefferson and Madison’s criticisms was as convincing as it was 
eloquent.  He stressed the idea that granting implicit Congressional powers to create 
corporations, like the Bank, would not lead to unlimited Federal powers as Jefferson and 
Madison feared.  He offered the example that Congress could not incorporate a Philadelphia 
police department “because [it is] not authorized to regulate” the government of localities.  
However, since Congress is authorized to regulate trade and collect taxes, it could “employ all 
                                                
7 Madison, James. "February 2nd - Bank of the United States." First Congress - Third Session. 2 
Feb. 1791. Online Library of Liberty. Web. 21 Mar. 2012.   
8 Brookhiser 92. 
9 Peterson, Merrill. "Secretary of State." Thomas Jefferson and the New Nation. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1970. 435. Print.    
10 Peterson 436.  
11 Staloff 314.  
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means which relate to its regulation to best and greatest advantage.”  This was a clear distinction 
of constitutional powers for Hamilton, and incorporating a National Bank was entirely 
compatible with this view.12 
 Furthermore, legislation based on implied powers was a constitutional norm at the time.  
No state Constitution explicitly mentioned bank incorporation, and yet the states had managed to 
erect banks without restriction.  The national legislature itself had often acted without explicit 
constitutional authority or “ironclad necessity” by creating light houses, buoys, beacons, public 
piers, and the like.  Why should the National Bank be treated any differently when it came to 
constitutional validation?  After all, not only states but other nations as well exercised implied 
powers routinely for their beneficial gains.  Thus, for Hamilton, the reality was that a National 
Bank would not lead to unrestricted Federal powers.  However, the striking down of the 
constitutionality of the bill would indeed suppress the potential of the federal government, and it 
would also run counter to existing practices.13 
 President George Washington was initially hesitant to sign the Bank bill, and asked his 
cabinet members to submit opinions on the matter.  Jefferson wrote a solid opinion but was 
outdone by Hamilton’s swift 15,000-word response.  Washington was convinced.  He signed the 
bill into law on April 25, 1791, much to the dismay and horror of Madison and Jefferson.14      
 Historians and political scholars alike tend to take the same approach toward analyzing 
Jefferson and Madison’s opposition to the National Bank.  This approach asserts that Jefferson 
and Madison’s strongest and most significant genuine criticism of the Bank was that they viewed 
it as unconstitutional.  This idea demonstrates the common historical belief that Madison and 
                                                
12 Staloff 118.  
13 Staloff 118-119.  
14 Peterson 434; Brookhiser 93. 
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Jefferson were legal supporters of an enumerated powers approach to constitutional 
interpretation in the National Bank Debate.  Examples of this majority historical opinion can be 
found in the writings of Merrill Peterson, Richard Brookhiser, James Roger Sharp, Richard 
Hofstadter, Gordon Wood, and many of their esteemed colleagues.  Generally, historians group 
Madison and Jefferson’s concerns with Hamilton’s Bank under the umbrella of constitutional 
criticism.  The following are examples of the way in which scholars characterize Madison and 
Jefferson’s opposition: 
“It was precisely on this ground [constitutionality] that Madison fought the Bank Bill in Congress and that 
Jefferson, upon its passage, sought its defeat at the hands of the President.”15 
 
“In his report, Madison let all the Republican Party’s hobby horses out for a ride.  Hamilton’s Bank of the 
United States and his Report on Manufactures were as unconstitutional as the Alien and Sedition Acts.”16  
 
“Jefferson, of course, never gave up his hostility to banks, and he saw in the Bank of the United States, 
which he still believed to be unconstitutional, a rival political force of great potentiality.”17 
 
Even when scholars grant the possibility that Madison and Jefferson had other worthy concerns 
with the Bank, they typically do so under the assertion that these other concerns were not as 
significant:  “Both Virginians, although they primarily opposed the Bank on Constitutional 
grounds, were also disturbed by what the establishment of the Bank seemed to represent…”18   
 In fact, a quantitative investigation of how much time historians devote to these 
characterizations paints a telling picture.  I have recorded numerous historical accounts of 
Madison and Jefferson’s opposition to the Bank, and it is clear that prominent scholars like 
Staloff, Brookhiser, Peterson, and Wood devote much more time to constitutional criticisms 
                                                
15 Peterson 433.  
16 Brookhiser 144.  
17 Hofstadter, Richard. "The Transit of Power." The Idea of a Party System. Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1969. 159. Print.  
18  Sharp, James Roger. "Breakdown of Elite Consensus, 1789-1792." American Politics in the 
Early Republic. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993. 38. Print.  
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made by Madison and Jefferson rather than concerns of any other kind.  To illustrate this, I aim 
to show the contrast between how many paragraphs these authors allow for describing 
constitutional criticisms as opposed to other qualms.  If a paragraph includes both constitutional 
and non-constitutional reasons of opposition, I did not count it barring one exception:  if the 
author explicitly states that constitutional concerns were primary.  In these cases, I added the 
paragraph to the count of described constitutional opposition (i.e. Sharp’s “The major objection 
he raised, however… was a constitutional one” p. 39).  I did not find any examples of an author 
describing both constitutional and non-constitutional opposition with an explicit affirmation that 
the non-constitutional concern was primary.  This quantitative analysis shows that Staloff 
devotes 11 paragraphs to Madison and Jefferson’s constitutional arguments and only 2 to other 
concerns.  Brookhiser allows 4 paragraphs to the former and only 1 to the latter.  Peterson writes 
5 paragraphs about constitutional criticisms and only 2 about other claims, and Wood’s score is 
4-0 in favor of constitutional arguments as well.  Therefore, just among this sample of four 
highly-esteemed scholars of American history, there are 24 paragraphs describing Madison and 
Jefferson’s opposition to Hamilton’s Bank as being primarily constitutional, while only 5 
paragraphs outline other concerns.19 
 However, when taking a step back to look at the big analytical picture, this common 
belief calls many ideas into question.  The Constitution was an extremely young document in 
1791, and it would perhaps be hasty to simply assume that Madison, Jefferson (who was not 
even present at the Constitutional Convention), and their colleagues were tremendously 
committed to all of its various facets as a source of supreme national legal power.  This is not to 
say that they would not be entirely devoted to its major fundamental freedoms and rights.  Yet a 
                                                
19 Staloff 97-98, 116-119, 310, 314; Brookhiser 91-93, 144; Peterson 432-436, 701; Wood 98-99, 
143-145. 
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total devotion to or a particular interpretation of something like the Necessary and Proper Clause 
would not necessarily be a forgone conclusion, especially for someone like Jefferson who 
proposed that the Constitution be rewritten every 20-30 years.  If Madison and Jefferson thought 
the Bank to be corrupt and economically unsound, why would they choose to dwell so much on 
the fact that it was unconstitutional?  Would it not be smarter to point out its economic and 
philosophical deficiencies, which many people would arguably care more about than the idea 
that the Bank defied an enumerated powers interpretation of a yet untested Constitution?     
 Of course, historians and scholars believe that Madison and Jefferson cared so much 
about the Bank’s unconstitutionality because this is what Madison and Jefferson themselves 
reiterated so often in speeches and writings.  But any thorough historical analyst knows to look 
past the surface of what these political leaders were saying and deep into what their true 
intentions were.  The reality is that in 1791, Madison and Jefferson had two available paths of 
opposition against the Bank:  the political-economic path and the legal path.  They chose the 
legal path, which is surprising given the strength of the alternative and the potential 
controversiality of the topic of constitutional legality of the Bank.  Yet many scholars seem to 
ignore this curious choice and faithfully trust that strict constructionism was the core principle of 
Madison and Jefferson’s intentions.   
 A more thorough investigation of the National Bank Debate merits a reconsideration of 
the modern historical analysis and, ultimately, a modification.  In reality, constitutionality was 
neither Madison nor Jefferson’s greatest qualm about the Bank, nor was it as important to them 
as their fears of the Bank’s corruptive and economically unsound consequences.  In fact, they 
were not legally committed to the Constitution in the context of the Bank debate nearly to the 
extent that historians claim.  This is not to say that they were not dedicated to fundamental 
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constitutional principles and freedoms.  This thesis certainly does not make such a bold and 
exaggerated assertion.  However, it does assert that Madison and Jefferson were not sincere legal 
proponents of an enumerated powers interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause as it 
pertained to the Bank bill.  In this context, an enumerated powers approach was rather an 
instrumental means to an end, not Madison and Jefferson’s fundamental goal.  Their true goal 
was to build a political-economic framework for their respective, ideal American republics.  
Both Madison and Jefferson’s plans for the future absolutely required an enumerated powers 
interpretation, or else this ideal republic would fall apart economically.  They also needed to 
convince their audience, President Washington, of the Bank’s deficiencies and probably thought 
it more prudent to do so through legal arguments.  Consequently, they needed Washington to 
ensure that the enumerated powers view in constitutional interpretation emerged victorious in the 
National Bank Debate and that a Hamiltonian implied powers view would die with the Bank bill.   
 Therefore, I will argue that Madison and Jefferson’s claims of unconstitutionality against 
the National Bank did not represent their true, significant, ideological qualms with Hamilton’s 
Bank bill nor a deep legal commitment to an enumerated powers approach to the Necessary and 
Proper Clause; instead they represented Madison and Jefferson’s knowledge of their audience 
and their personal desires to promote the enumerated powers approach as an instrumental policy 
in light of their ultimate political and economic goals.           
 If Madison and Jefferson’s opposition to the Bank centered on a disingenuous claim for 
unconstitutionality, the implications for today’s constitutional discussion would be significant.  
The National Bank debate was one of the first truly noteworthy disputes regarding the 
constitutionality of a piece of legislation.  As a momentous historical event, it influenced the 
amount of weight that the modern American government places on constitutionality.  If Madison 
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and Jefferson were insincere in their calls for an enumerated powers interpretation, today’s 
strong emphasis on the Constitution as a legal pinnacle – although justified – may be based on a 
false understanding of history.   
 
Context for the Debate and the Opposition’s Arguments 
 In understanding the National Bank Debate and why certain aspects of it were surprising, 
one must first understand its context.  This includes the prevalent economic and constitutional 
theories, as well as the sectional divides that existed in the United States at the time.  In practical 
terms, Madison and Jefferson did not just stand on the opposing side of Hamilton in relation to 
the Bank, but also to his general economic and legal approaches to running the American 
republic.  It may be useful to distinguish between the two main areas of disagreement between 
these men.  The first is the political-economic realm, where Jefferson and Madison fought tooth 
and nail for a virtuous America and against what they viewed as Hamilton’s industrial sinkholes 
of corruption and fraud.  Meanwhile, Hamilton had no qualms about discarding the classical 
republican concept of virtue in order to strengthen the American economy in the best way he saw 
fit: manufactures.   
 The second realm of conflict between Hamilton and his two adversaries was the legal 
arena.  Here, Hamilton called for an implied powers interpretation of the Constitution while 
Madison and Jefferson feared that this view would lead to the worst kinds of unlimited Federal 
power. 
 Why would Madison and Jefferson use the second realm of legal reasoning to attack 
Hamilton’s Bank when the first political-economic arena would be relevant in a society 
constantly torn between the economic virtues of the past and modern commercialism?  Were 
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they sincere in making this choice, or were their legal constitutional criticisms of the Bank a 
mask for their true political-economic convictions?   
 
Economic Context – The Spectrum 
 During the National Bank Debate, the political model widely held to be most effective for 
a nation of free men, rid of any tyrannical oppression, was republicanism.  Many versions of 
republicanism entered political and economic discussion, and men of various beliefs proclaimed 
themselves to be republicans.  Yet republicanism’s common denominator at all stages was the 
idea that freedom ultimately meant the lack of arbitrary power.  A commitment against arbitrary 
power was crucial and could be effectively accomplished through virtuous practices aimed at 
achieving the public good.20  This assertion also had implications in the economic realm as well 
as on the political-economic policies that Madison, Jefferson, and Hamilton individually 
supported.  
 In the ancient world, the word “Free,” in a republican sense, described a particular social 
class – men who were not slaves or serfs.  The word also referred to the type of virtue and 
character these men were supposed to reflect.  Ultimately, a “Free Man” was independent and 
self-sufficient.  Ancient Greco-Roman society saw freedom as an extremely exclusive privilege.  
Subordinate classes of men (serfs, slaves) supposedly lacked the ability to be virtuous.  
Moreover, they regularly performed commercial and menial labor – work that killed virtue and 
corrupted the individual.  Thus, only men who did not shoulder the burden of this corruptive 
                                                
20 MacGilvray, Eric. "Republican Freedom." The Invention of Market Freedom. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011. Print.  
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labor – or free men – could truly possess the type of virtue that classical republican ideals 
required.21   
 As history wound its way into the eighteenth century, different interpretations of 
republicanism had a massive effect on scholars’ and politicians’ perceptions of rapidly 
commercializing society.  Thinkers like Rousseau and Jefferson looked to ancient Roman history 
for guidance on how to preserve republican liberty and avoid tyranny.  Under the right set of 
conditions for political institutions, these men believed, the classical republican ideal of a 
virtuous citizenry working for the public good was still very much possible even in a society bent 
on industrialization and manufactures; commercialized society would have to be severely 
regulated with the republican virtuous end in mind.  Montesquieu, Smith, and Hamilton 
disagreed with this approach.  They thought that a reliance on ancient history for lessons on 
republicanism was useless because modern commercial societies confronted entirely different 
challenges than those of ancient Greece and Rome.  It was in these new challenges of the 
eighteenth century that Hamilton, for example, looked for commercial resources that would 
enhance a republican character within the US by freeing it from a dependence on foreign 
economic powers.22  
  For the purposes of this thesis, it is useful to locate Madison, Jefferson, and Hamilton on 
a political spectrum of republican thought.  Jefferson was a man whom it is best to describe as a 
traditional republican – one who valued agrarian virtue over commercial industrialization and 
desired autonomy and freedom for agricultural producers from the Northern cities of the 
manufacturers.  These cities Jefferson saw as corrupt and fraudulent, and their control over 
agrarian economic virtue was exactly the type of arbitrary power he wished to avoid.  In this 
                                                
21 MacGilvray 84-87. 
22 MacGilvray 90-91. 
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sense, Jefferson subscribed to the classical republicanism of ancient Greece and Rome described 
above.  He also borrowed much of his ideology from the doctrine of physiocracy, as described by 
Ronald Meek: 
“The Physiocrats’ main aim was to illuminate the operation of the basic causes which determined the 
general level of economic activity.  For this purpose, they believed that it was useful to conceive economic 
activity as taking the form of a sort of ‘circle,’ or circular flow as we would call it today… Within this 
circle, the Physiocrats then endeavoured to discover some key variable, movements in which could be 
regarded as the basic factor causing an expansion or contraction in the ‘dimensions’ of the circle, i.e. in the 
general level of economic activity.  The variable they hit upon was the capacity of agriculture to yield a net 
product.”23 
 
Agriculture and agriculture alone yielded this net product, was morally and politically superior to 
all other forms of economic output, and thus made land the most indispensable commodity in the 
physiocratic system.24 
 Hamilton stood on the other end of the republican spectrum.  He was not concerned with 
battling corruption to preserve virtue.  To rescue the country from succumbing to arbitrary power 
in the form of foreign market control, Hamilton aimed to strengthen the economy through 
manufactures and an elaborate system of debt relief, which of course included the incorporation 
of a National Bank.  “In many respects, Hamilton was an anomaly… he had succeeded in 
discarding the traditional republican heritage that had so heavily influenced the Revolutionary 
mind.”25  If America could stand its ground against foreign competitors in international trade as a 
result of its prosperous economy, Hamilton did not so much care if this economy was built on a 
somewhat corrupt foundation.  A focus on agricultural virtue could be enough to sustain an 
American economy, but Hamilton wanted economic glory and firm independence from foreign 
economic influence, which required a more industrialized approach.  These were republican 
                                                
23 Meek, Ronald. "Introduction." The Economics of Physiocracy. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1963. Print.  
24 Meek 18-19. 
25 McCoy 132. 
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goals in themselves, although they lay on a different part of the republican political spectrum 
than Madison and Jefferson’s.   
 Madison fell somewhere in the middle of these two adversaries on the spectrum of 
republican thought.  He certainly embraced economic prosperity in the form of manufactures, but 
he dreaded the destruction of agrarian principles.  He also battled ambivalence toward the 
economic theory that was rising in dominance in America:  mercantilism.  Although Madison 
claimed that he wished to free America from the oppression of mercantilism, he nonetheless 
espoused a highly mercantilist policy of commercial discrimination in foreign trade.  As he tried 
to reconcile these opposing motivations, other theorists, too, considered and rejected mercantilist 
principles. 
 
Economic Context – Discourse Leading up to 1791 
 In the late eighteenth century, mercantilism posed a heavy challenge to traditional 
agrarian principles of republicanism.  Philipp Wilhelm von Hornick comprehensively 
summarizes its nine major tenets:  
• That every inch of a country's soil be utilized for agriculture, mining or manufacturing. 
• That all raw materials found in a country be used in domestic manufacture, since finished goods have a 
higher value than raw materials. 
• That a large, working population be encouraged. 
• That all export of gold and silver be prohibited and all domestic money be kept in circulation. 
• That all imports of foreign goods be discouraged as much as possible. 
• That where certain imports are indispensable they be obtained at first hand, in exchange for other domestic 
goods instead of gold and silver. 
• That as much as possible, imports be confined to raw materials that can be finished [in the home country]. 
• That opportunities be constantly sought for selling a country's surplus manufactures to foreigners, so far as 
necessary, for gold and silver. 
• That no importation be allowed if such goods are sufficiently and suitably supplied at home.26 
 
                                                
26 Ekelund, Robert B. and Robert F. Herbert. A History of Economic Theory and Method. Long 
Grove: Waveland Press, 1997.  40-41. Print.  
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 “To more and more Americans the traditional mercantilist assumption that manufactures were 
necessary to maintain industry and full employment, heretofore considered relevant only to 
Europe, seemed suddenly and ominously relevant [in America],” explains Drew McCoy.27  In 
fact, according to William Appleman Williams, “the central characteristic of American history 
from 1763 to 1828 was the development and maturation of American mercantilism.”28  It is easy 
to confuse America’s rebellion against Britain as a rebellion against mercantilism as well, but 
this would be a mistake.  In truth, post-revolutionary American hopes for empire actually 
stemmed from mercantilist inclinations acquired from and maintained after British colonial 
rule.29       
      Mercantilism was a crucial tenet for people like Madison who worked within a 
nationalistic framework to build a balanced, dynamic, agricultural, and commercial economy 
based on capitalism.  “Whether agrarian or urban, mercantilists were essentially nationalists who 
strove for self-sufficiency through increased domestic production and a favorable balance of 
trade,” says Williams.  Self-sufficiency was another political element that constituted an essential 
republican goal of freedom from arbitrary power.  Mercantilists concentrated on production 
along with the regulation of export markets and sources of raw material.  Thus, their focus 
shifted from consumption and economic interdependence, to fears of deficits as an indicator of 
economic crisis.  This can be seen in Madison’s commercial discrimination policy that fervently 
aimed to restore a favorable balance of trade for the US and to control foreign export markets by 
opening up more “natural” channels for American trade.  Export more and import less, 
mercantilists said, and it seemed as though America listened. 
                                                
27 McCoy 106.  
28 Williams, William Appleman. "The Age of Mercantilism." The William and Mary Quarterly 3 
ser. 15.4 (1958): 419. Print.   
29 Williams 421.  
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 Yet many economists did not listen but rather rebelled against mercantilism and 
traditional agrarian-focused republicanism both, and with a vengeance.  Philosophers like Adam 
Smith and David Hume asserted that the pursuit of individual private interest was the best and 
most efficient method of enhancing the public good (instead of the republican pursuit of 
collective societal virtue).  Hume encouraged the pursuit of luxury, framing it as both an 
inevitable and refining human action, rather than as a degrading behavior of selfish men.  The 
desire for luxury was an industrial stimulus, and it would be futile to try to stamp it out, while 
properly harnessed, it opposed indolence and encouraged men to work harder.30   
 Meanwhile Smith’s challenges to mercantilism were also striking.  He explained that the 
main benefit of foreign trade was not the importation of gold and silver, “but the carrying out of 
surplus produce for which there is no demand and bringing back something for which there is.”  
He continued to denounce the mercantilist claim that the importation of gold and silver was 
necessary to maintain a strong America.  Smith postulated that “The nation which, from the 
annual produce of its domestic industry, from the annual revenue arising out of its lands, labour, 
and consumable stock, has wherewithal to purchase those consumable goods in distant countries, 
can maintain foreign wars there,” and can thus maintain its strength.31   
 One of Smith’s greatest contributions to economic thought was his emphasis on the 
Division of Labor principle:  the more specialized the task of each individual laborer, the greater 
the economic output.  The establishment of this principle with respect to foreign markets directly 
contradicted the essential mercantilist tenet of favoring exports.  Calvin Johnson explains, “once 
free trade replaced mercantilism as an economic philosophy… importing British woolens and 
                                                
30 Hume, David. "Of Refinement in the Arts." 1742. MS. 
31 Adam, Smith. "Of the Principle of the Commercial or Mercantile System." An Inquiry into the 
Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1776. N. pag. 
Print.  
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other manufactured goods came to be seen as a wise decision to buy the highest quality goods at 
the best price abroad, rather than wasting resources doing an inferior job more expensively at 
home.”32 
 There existed also a split not simply between theoretical principles but also between 
geographical locations.  The Northern and Southern sections of the United States were constantly 
at odds with each other, and these arguments stemmed from both economic disagreements and a 
Southern perception of commercial favoritism by the government toward the North.  Jefferson 
was the voice of the Southern struggle against a federal government filled with the likes of 
Hamilton who (in his view) blatantly favored Northern manufacturers and financiers over noble 
Southern agricultural producers – the virtuous yeomen.  Factory-run cities and corruption 
threatened the Southern republican character by forcing producers to become dependent on 
commerce and manufactures in order to participate in a swiftly industrializing American 
economy.  This dependence led to a loss of autonomy, and the vicious cycle continued.   
 Moreover, the South resented the Northern condemnation of slavery.  Republicanism and 
true civic participation required that menial labor be left to the slaves so that the free Southerners 
could perform their political duties unburdened.  Here stood the Northerners, with Hamilton as 
their face, championing commercial progress and an industrialized society that they wished to 
impose on the South.  Meanwhile, the Southerners, forced to accept dependence on the North, 
would even further have to decrease agricultural productivity and self-sufficiency by giving up 
slavery.  This was a set of conditions that the South and Jefferson simply were not willing to 
accept.33           
                                                
32 Johnson, Calvin H. "The Panda's Thumb." William and Mary Bill of Rights Journal 13.1 
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The Political-Economic Discourse in 1791 
 As free trade principles began to overtake mercantilist leanings, and as both challenged 
the predominant traditional agrarian republican theories of the past, the Founders tried to balance 
the young economy between modernization and a deeply ingrained commitment to virtue.   
 By the 1791 National Bank Debate, proponents of traditional republicanism confronted a 
difficult challenge in the face of new free trade and mercantilist interpretations of republicanism.  
They had to reconcile their support for a theory focused on the virtuous pursuit of the public 
good with Smithian endorsements of self-interest economics.  As already mentioned, classical 
republicanism, throughout all of its historical stages and alterations, espoused the freedom from 
arbitrary power.34  How could this republicanism survive in a world where Adam Smith’s free 
market “Invisible Hand” was the epitome of an unimpeded, arbitrary power?  As Drew McCoy 
explains, “American revolutionaries enthusiastically embraced the republican spirit of classical 
antiquity that expressed virtue in terms of a primitive economy, but they also seemed to realize 
that this spirit had to be accommodated to their own dynamic world of commercial 
complexity.”35  In a way, Thomas Jefferson became the face of this struggle.  He found himself 
in a political arena that was hurtling through commercialization while he remained committed to 
agrarian virtue and anticorruption.  
 Merrill Peterson explains that there were many aspects of the Hamiltonian policy 
preferences that troubled Jefferson, and most troubling at the time were economic factors 
surrounding the National Bank.  But besides the immoral, corrupting economic whirlwind that 
would surround the creation of the Bank, what Jefferson protested against the most was the 
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length of the Bank charter.  The enduring Bank charter would only exacerbate the sectional 
imbalances that would result from its policies, and it would do so for a seemingly unending 
eleven years.  For eleven years, this Bank would serve as a helper to Northern merchant 
economies and as a detriment to Southern planters, farmers, and men of agrarian virtue.  
Jefferson was truly alarmed by these politics of inequity.  He had always been plagued by the 
favoritism the national system afforded to Northern industry at the expense of Southern 
agricultural producers.  The Bank would become another tipping point in favor of the North.  
When it came to the Bank, “Jefferson could not approve of the measure in the abstract or in the 
face of the Constitution; even more, he was convinced it was politically unsound, and he would 
not… take any responsibility for it.”36   
 What always made it extremely hard for Hamilton to convince Jefferson of the growing 
benefits for an industrialized America built on manufacturing was that – in Hamilton’s own 
words – Jefferson thought, as did many physiocrats of the time, that “agriculture [was], not only, 
the most productive, but the only productive species of industry.”37  Jefferson viewed land as the 
only valuable economic resource, while commerce and manufactures just altered part of this 
value into other forms.  This transformation, however, added no value of its own.  Industries, 
Jefferson viewed as “sinkholes of vice and corruption.”  In general, urban industrial development 
was a blight to be avoided, and if this was not possible, at least postponed.  Instead of setting 
urban industrial development as a national objective, the country would fare better by focusing 
on westward expansion.  In order to avoid corruptive industrial development, Jefferson first had 
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to defeat the National Bank bill, the most “insidious engine” of Hamilton’s entire economic 
system that would surely lead America to its ruin.38 
 Hamilton’s policies, especially as seen in the Bank bill, completely negated the 
Jeffersonian vision.  They would enrich northern financiers and speculators, and therefore the 
North – instead of the (as Jefferson saw it) virtuous agrarian South – would gain disproportionate 
standing in the national government; Northern urban development would draw capital away from 
westward agricultural expansion through the stimulation of manufactures.  The moment when 
Jefferson realized the scope of the threat that Hamilton’s political economy posed, with the Bank 
serving as a microcosm of the general anti-republican character of Hamilton’s policies, was the 
moment when Jefferson abandoned his usually timid political presence and fully entered the 
conflict against the Bank.39 
 Although Madison ultimately took Jefferson’s side in the National Bank debate, his 
political-economic policy preferences were not as hostile to commercialization and 
industrialization as were Jefferson’s.  Yet Madison was in no way a proponent of the type of 
commercial society Hamilton had in mind, and in some ways, he tended to revert to the 
republican virtue that Jefferson so passionately espoused as well.  Madison had a particularly 
interesting set of ambitions for the young republic, preferring for America to develop across 
space rather than time.  In other words, he believed the American economy would prosper more 
quickly if American producers also occupied western territories.  With more land to work with, 
the limitations of time would not be so great to a much-expanded American economic potential 
of output.  Madison explained, “if America could continue to resort to virgin lands while opening 
adequate foreign markets for their produce, the US would remain a nation of industrious farmers 
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who marketed their surpluses abroad and purchased ‘finer’ manufactures they desired in return.”  
Madison wholeheartedly supported this form of social development – as did Adam Smith – 
because this was a policy that agreed with the “natural” law of the free market.  The policy 
represented noninterference with the market, and if America could benefit economically without 
interference, it was taking the right approach.  These Smithian economic principles were both 
extremely popular in post-Revolutionary America and compatible with the nation’s strain of 
republican thought.  As described by McCoy, “Madison’s commitment to westward expansion 
and ‘free trade’ put him in the mainstream of republican thought at the end of the war.”40 
 A key tenet of Madisonian policy was to free America of the chains of British 
mercantilism.  Yet his somewhat contradictory stance toward mercantilism reared its head when 
he pushed for a policy of commercial discrimination – arguably a mercantilist policy in itself.  In 
his eyes, British actions confined American trade to “artificial channels” and denied it full access 
to “natural markets” such as the West Indies.  According to Madison, British merchants and 
capital overwhelmed American trade and, thus, restricted foreign markets to American exports.  
This worry would continue to plague him for many years even beyond the Bank Debate.  “Now 
as the productions of the United States, from their bulky character, employ at least ten times the 
tonnage which is required for the exports of Great Britain… it follows… that an undue 
advantage accrues to the British navigation,” he wrote to Rufus King in the Department of State, 
“[and] it is equally certain that the regulation actually adopted by Great Britain must have the 
effect of monopolizing the transportation of the whole mass of our bulky articles, whilst the most 
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that can be hoped by the United States will be a monopoly for their vessels of British articles not 
amounting to one tenth of that bulk.”41    
 Moreover, by diverting American trade into the aforementioned “artificial channels,” 
British actions threatened the honorable, American, republican character.  Without “natural” 
channels, America could not function within a free market trade system because, within the 
artificial channels, producers could not find enough demand for American products.  The 
solution was a retaliatory and discriminatory trade policy against Britain.   Madison explained 
that this would greatly hamper British trade prowess since Britain depended so much on 
American trade itself.42  
 In order to preserve a strong republican character, Madison called for a strong Federal 
government (which is interesting, in light of his intense opposition to overly centralized Federal 
power in the context of the National Bank Debate – to be discussed later).  This strong federal 
government would “dismantle restrictive mercantilist systems that obstructed the marketing of 
American agricultural surpluses.”  The opening of more foreign markets through his policy of 
commercial discrimination would further ensure that Americans would not be compelled to 
pursue occupations that degraded their republican character out of economic necessity.43 McCoy 
emphasizes the core of the conflict between Madison and Hamilton’s political-economic 
mindsets:  “In one sense Madison was still caught between the conflicting claims of classical 
republicanism and modern commercial society, struggling to define and implement a variable 
synthesis that was relevant to the American experience.  Hamilton had stepped confidently and 
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unequivocally into modernity.”44  Yet this eagerness to enter modernity caused many of 
Hamilton’s adversaries, including Madison, to see him as a conspirator out to corrupt American 
society and destroy its republican character.  Worse, Madison thought Hamilton would initiate 
this destruction with his desire to imitate British “forms, manners, and institutions” through 
American economic policies.  Appalled republicans compared Hamilton to Sir Robert Walpole, 
who, they argued, singlehandedly corrupted British society through regularization and 
consolidation of the financial system.  Madison was outraged by what he envisioned to be a 
corrupted legislature, under the control of the avaricious Hamilton, tied to an immoral economic 
system and reckless speculation. 
 Madison also saw the scope of the political ramifications that would result from 
Hamilton’s specific economic aspirations.  Instead of allowing manufactures to grow at their 
own pace, Hamilton wished to subsidize, what Madison considered to be, “artificial” monopolies 
that would destroy private, “natural” producers and create destructive anti-republican inequalities 
in wealth.  Thus, privileged workers’ groups would be utterly reliant on the government for their 
livelihoods, and this would enhance Hamilton’s corrupt and malicious influence over the nation.  
Ultimately, this chain of events would serve as a threat to republican ideals and a democratic 
government, because as Madison explained, “stock-jobbers will become the pretorian band of the 
Government, at once its tool and its tyrant; bribed by its largesses, and overawing it by clamours 
and combinations.”45 
 Hamilton, on the other hand, saw himself as the forward thinking savior of American 
political economy.  He rapidly developed his economic initiatives for the nation and published 
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them in his First Report on Public Credit, Second Report on Public Credit (which contained the 
Bank proposal), and the Report on Manufactures.  The Report on Manufactures eloquently 
encompassed his major political-economic goals through a firm defense of manufactures and a 
detailed prospectus for American industry.  It also confirmed the sheer incompatibility of 
Hamiltonian and Madisonian political-economic principles.46  Finally, it demonstrated 
Hamilton’s unwillingness to completely adhere to Smithian free trade theory. 
 Hamilton opposed both Madison and Smith’s visions for American trade in a free trade 
international order.  Yes, free trade allowed the United States to import whatever it found 
necessary, but the problem lay in demand for American exports.  The republic was young and 
could not ensure satisfactory demand for its agricultural surpluses.  The severely limited nature 
of American access to foreign markets, caused by restrictions of the hated European 
mercantilism, would continue to exacerbate this problem.  Instead of Madison’s calls for 
commercial discrimination against the British (who Hamilton did not believe were as dependent 
on American trade as did Madison), Hamilton proposed a domestic solution.  To offset 
agricultural surpluses, he encouraged domestic manufacture production.  Government assistance 
would help develop native manufactures and would result in a more reliable market at home.  
The economy would become “faster… stronger, more balanced, [and] sectionally 
interdependent.”  Gradually, American power would become so enhanced that perhaps someday 
a Madisonian policy of commercial reciprocity and discrimination would become feasible.  At 
the moment, however, Hamilton believed Madisonian commercial discrimination would only 
lead to “a disastrous commercial war with Britain.”47     
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 Hamilton, like Smith, promoted a complex society with an intense division of labor and 
efficient public manufacturing, along with diverse productivity and a civilized and refined 
citizenry.  He agreed with Smith that the division of labor was the essential element of a 
progressive society.  However, he did not care much for Smith’s worries about its dehumanizing 
aspects.  Adam Smith had published various works about the degrading effects that immensely 
specialized labor can have on an individual who performs the same tasks for hours a day:   
“The man whose whole life is spent in performing a few simple operations… generally becomes as stupid and 
ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become.  The torpor of his mind renders him, not only incapable of 
relishing or bearing a part in any rational conversation, but of conceiving any generous, noble, or tender sentiment, 
and consequently of forming any just judgment concerning many even of the ordinary duties of private life.48 
   
Hamilton did not hold this concern.  In his Report on Manufactures, Hamilton spoke much of 
“augmenting the productive powers of labor” through its division, and not once mentioned any 
dehumanizing aspects.49  In fact, he had little patience for men who shied away from complex, 
progressive, economic societies because of a fear of the destruction of the republican character. 
 This lack of concern with virtue stemmed from his younger, developmental years when 
Hamilton became quite receptive to the writings of David Hume both about political economy 
and constitutional thought.  Based on Hume’s influence, Hamilton accepted commercial society 
as “inevitable and salutary.”  Inevitable also was the human disposition away from classical 
conceptions of virtue and toward luxury.  Thus, Hamilton ultimately came to the conclusion that 
classical republican virtue was “hopelessly irrelevant” to the American experience.  Therefore, 
he subscribed not to the same republican theories that glorified agrarian virtue as did Jefferson 
and Madison, but to the writings of Robert Morris, a financier and signer of the Declaration of 
Independence, who had created a “formula that integrated constitutional change with the funding 
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of the Revolutionary debt and a vigorous program of economic expansion tied to the 
consolidation and mobilization of mercantile capital.”50   
 More importantly, Hamilton did not share Madison and Jefferson’s sheer contempt for 
Great Britain and its economic policies.  In fact, Hamilton wished for America to become much 
like the British state – a powerful economically advanced modern nation.  He did not promote a 
virtuous agrarian republic in the least.  His American republic could “stand squarely on the 
worldly foundations of ‘corruption,’” as did Great Britain.  Therefore, the reality was that 
Hamilton’s political-economic objectives were not plagued with traditional republican fears that 
shaped Madison and Jefferson’s thinking.  Hamilton acknowledged and accepted “social 
inequality, propertyless dependence,” and the unimpeded avarice that would emerge in and were 
necessary for a powerful and prosperous society.51    
           
Legal Context- Leading Up to 1791 
 The National Bank Debate also took place in the midst of a legal arena that pitted two 
differing constitutional interpretations against each other.  Such were the arguments for an 
enumerated powers interpretation versus an implied powers view.  The enumerated powers were 
located in Article 1, Section 8, and explicitly outlined all of the powers the Constitution granted 
to Congress.  However throughout history, and especially as a result of Federal court decisions, 
these powers have been broadened to expand Congressional authority.  This broadening has been 
based on what powers many judges and scholars believe the Founders had implied to grant to 
Congress, regardless of whether these were explicitly enumerated.  Enumerated powers 
proponents, as Madison and Jefferson presented themselves to be in the Bank Debate, promoted 
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the idea that Congress only had those powers that were listed in Article 1, Section 8 – no more, 
no less.  Those like Hamilton who favored an implied powers interpretation asserted that the 
Constitution also implicitly allowed other Congressional powers, for example, the power of 
incorporating a Bank without an expressly written power to do so.    
 The two-sided argument also centered on the Necessary and Proper Clause of the 
Constitution (“The Congress shall have Power - To make all Laws which shall be necessary and 
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this 
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof”).  
Some theorists explained that a correct interpretation of the clause granted Congress the power to 
make laws only if the lack of said laws would deprive it of the ability to carry out its enumerated 
powers.  Their opponents however claimed that the Necessary and Proper Clause effectively 
expanded Congressional authority to include powers tangentially related to the enumerated 
powers.  The distinct interpretations would clash heatedly in the National Bank Debate.52  
  
Legal Context in 1791 - Argument Against the Bank 
 While Hamilton’s preferences lay with an implied powers interpretation of the 
Constitution – one in which implicit justification for unwritten Congressional powers was quite 
enough – Madison and Jefferson insisted on the enumerated powers approach.  They argued 
against Hamilton that to treat the power to establish a bank as an implied power resulting from 
the constitutional power to borrow (Necessary and Proper Clause) was “to take possession of a 
boundless field of power, no longer susceptible to any definition” or restriction.53 
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 Madison’s concerns lay with Hamilton’s interpretation of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause partly because Hamilton’s emphasis of abundant monetary supply as the best means for 
augmenting American manufactures gave Congress an almost unlimited power to interpret that 
clause.  In Hamilton’s own words, “it is… of necessity left to the discretion of the National 
legislation to pronounce upon the objects, which concern the general welfare, and for which 
under that description, an appropriation of money is requisite and proper.”  This Madison 
described as entirely incompatible with any sense of a limited republican government, corrupt, 
avaricious, and subversive of the public good.  He wrote to Henry Lee of the dangers of such 
unrestricted power: “The federal Govt has been hitherto limited to the specified powers, by the 
Greatest Champions for Latitude in expounding those powers—If not only the means, but the 
objects are unlimited, the parchment had better be thrown into the fire at once.”54    
 On the other side of the legal arena, Hamilton viewed the necessity for an implied powers 
approach as part of a political responsibility that he prioritized in every way.  This responsibility 
demanded the belief that, in the context of constitutional powers, ought implied could.  “If a 
government [was] to be charged with certain tasks and duties, it must be armed with the requisite 
authority and resources to discharge those duties.”  Hamilton was in the business of matching 
means to ends and not the other way around.  In his own words, “every power ought to be 
commensurate with its object… there ought to be no limitation of a power destined to effect a 
purpose.”55 
 Hamilton may have even given credence to Madison and Jefferson’s concerns about 
tyrannical centralized government.  Perhaps he was in no position to firmly disprove the idea that 
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under a rare and dangerous set of conditions, a tyrant could emerge in America as a consequence 
of an overly centralized federal power.  But this was unlikely, and while Madison and Jefferson 
feared hypothetical dangers, the pragmatic Hamilton worked to improve real and present 
economic inefficiencies: “the practice of mankind ought to have great weight against the theories 
of individuals.”  Specifically, the practice of national banks was already a “widely accepted 
engine in the administration of national finances.”  They were also the most effective method of 
providing loans without interfering with the states or the people.  That is, states could still erect 
as many banks as they wanted, and any individual could still participate in banking to any degree 
that he desired.  Whether the fact that a practice was widely held compensated for it potentially 
clashing with the Constitution did not worry Hamilton.  His rule was simple:  “If the end be 
clearly comprehended within any of the specified powers of the Constitution – in this case, the 
collection of taxes, regulation of trade, and procurement of credit – it may safely be deemed to 
come within the compass of national authority.”56      
  
The Real National Bank Debate 
 The reality is that when Madison and Jefferson embarked on the legal constitutional path 
to fighting Hamilton’s Bank, they also embarked on a path of insincerity and political 
maneuvering.  Evidence indicates that their true objectives in opposing the Bank lay squarely in 
the political-economic realm, but their audience lay with President Washington, a man who 
genuinely cared about the legal significance of the Constitution.  Madison and Jefferson could 
put their true concerns with the Bank on proud display, but the risk of losing the debate was too 
great if Washington was the judge.  Ironically, they faltered regardless, and their legal ploy to 
                                                
56 Staloff 118-119.  
 30 
accuse the Bank of being unconstitutional was ineffective anyway.  Perhaps they would have 
been better off with the political economy argument. 
 
Correspondence 
 Both Madison and Jefferson’s correspondence with various politicians and with each 
other after the passage of the Bank bill is curious in light of their public insistence on its 
unconstitutionality.  After a full year of rousing Congressional speeches and writings about the 
rampant disregard for the Constitution by Hamilton and his Bank bill, Madison was mostly quiet 
on anything but the Bank’s economic flaws once it had passed.  In the immediate decade after 
the Bank’s passage, Madison emphasized the Bank’s unconstitutionality infrequently in his 
significant reports.  Once was in a February 1791 letter to Edmund Pendleton which simply and 
quickly summarized the Bill’s presence in the hands of Washington and the points Madison 
made against it in his early February speeches to Congress.  Another instance occurred in the 
1799-1800 Report on the Resolutions, in which Madison amended and assuaged criticisms of the 
1798 Virginia Resolutions.  Madison raised a point, made by the Virginia General Assembly, 
which outlined how the government had forced certain Constitutional constructions on the 
American people in order to enlarge its own Federal powers.  He mainly focused on the Alien 
and Sedition acts but mentioned the Bank as well:  “Omitting others which have less occupied 
public attention, or been less extensively regarded as unconstitutional, the resolution [made by 
the General Assembly may] be presumed to refer particularly to the Bank law.”57  Thus, Madison 
was convinced that the General Assembly referred to the Bank bill when discussing 
constitutional overstepping by the government in the past.  What is interesting here is that this 
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report focused mostly on the Alien and Sedition Acts, was written almost a decade after the Bank 
bill’s passage, and is still one of the only significant mentions that Madison made about the 
Bank’s unconstitutionality after its passage.  The aforementioned references to the Bank by 
Madison are the only ones that allude to its unconstitutionality out of the total of seventeen Bank 
references he made in the decade after it passed in his reports and correspondence.  This analysis 
is based on the compilation of Madison’s writings, compiled by Gaillard Hunt in the early 1900s 
– an extensive nine-volume collection of Madison’s writings.58 
 Madison’s typical correspondence about the Bank in the years after its passage instead 
focused on its economic inadequacies, especially in writing to Thomas Jefferson.  In 1793, 
Madison wrote to Jefferson about monied interests surrounding the Bank:  
“It is said, that Marshal who is at the head of the great purchase from Fairfax, has lately obtained pecuniary 
aids from the Bank or people connected with it.  I think it certain that he must have felt, in the moment of 
purchase an absolute dependence on the monied interest, which will explain him to everyone that reflects, 
in the active character he is assuming.”59 
 
In an earlier letter, dated July 10, 1791, Madison complained of rising Bank shares that 
benefitted subscribers and financiers instead of the virtuous republican producers:  
 
“The Bank shares have risen as much in the Market here as at Philadelphia.  It seems admitted on all hands 
now that the plan of the institution gives a moral certainty of gain to the subscribers with scarce a physical 
possibility of loss.”60 
 
At times Madison broadened his criticisms by going further than simply criticizing the Bank’s 
economic consequences and related these consequences to societal corruption that so weighed on 
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his mind during the Bank debate.  Three days after the previous letter, Madison again wrote to 
Jefferson and explained the situation in Boston: 
 
“We understand here that 800 shares in the Bank, committed by this city to Mr. Constable, have been 
excluded by the manner in which the business was conducted, that a considerable number from Boston met 
with the same fate, and that Baltimore has been kept out… It is all charged on the maneuvres of Philada. 
which is said to have secured a majority of the whole to herself. The disappointed individuals are 
clamorous of course, and the language of the place marks a general indignation on the subject. If it should 
turn out that the cards were packed for the purpose of securing the game to Philada or even that more than 
half the Institution and of course the whole direction of it, have fallen into the hands of that City, some who 
have been loudest in their plaudits whilst they expected to share in the plunder, will be equally so in 
sounding the injustice of monopoly, and the danger of undue influence on the Government.”61 
 
 Other excerpts from Madison’s correspondence to Jefferson include an August 1791 
letter describing the Bank as a “certain and gratuitous augmentation of the capitals subscribed,”62 
and an August 1793 letter discussing the “fiscal system, particularly the Bank.”63  Clearly, the 
majority of Madison’s correspondence about the Bank centered around its economic aspects, 
which seems rather odd after his boisterous condemnations of it in the constitutional arena right 
before the Bank’s passage.  Furthermore, the only three times that Madison touched on the 
Bank’s unconstitutionality, as outlined in the Hunt compilation, were when he wrote to someone 
other than Jefferson.  In all of his correspondence with Jefferson about the Bank, Madison only 
mentioned economic factors.  It seems strange that Madison would avoid discussing 
constitutional factors with the man that was his most important teammate in the fight to prove the 
Bank unconstitutional, unless constitutionality was not the true concern they shared in their 
opposition.   
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 To be sure, there was no official mode of redress at this time for overturning executively 
approved laws that some deemed unconstitutional.  It may be true that Madison felt it useless to 
discuss the constitutional question involving the Bank because he did not know how to challenge 
Washington’s opinion.  Yet by including economic factors in his correspondence about the Bank, 
Madison demonstrated that he was not above complaining about aspects of a law that had 
already passed.  If he did not see it as useless to express his economic concerns with the Bank, 
why would he deem it to be useless to express constitutional concerns? 
 Fueling the fire of suspicion are Jefferson’s correspondences, which made zero references 
to the Bank’s unconstitutionality in the years following its passage, based on an extensive 12-
volume compilation of these correspondences by Paul Leicester Ford.64  The only time Jefferson 
even came close to discussing government corruption in the legal realm in such a way as might 
have encompassed the Bank issue appeared in a February 1791 letter to George Mason, just prior 
to the Bank’s passage.  Perhaps referring to Hamilton, Jefferson said, 
“It cannot be denied that we have among us a sect who [wish] to contain whatever is perfect in human 
institutions. … I still rely that the great mass of our community is untainted with these heresies, as is its 
head.” 
 
Further in the letter, Jefferson bemoaned the effects of this corrupting sect and foresaw the 
consequences of its actions, which included a rather bleak and resigned prediction for the Bank:  
“What is said in our country of the fiscal arrangements now going and I really fear their effect when I 
consider the present temper of the Southern states.  Whether these measures be right or wrong abstractedly, 
more attention should be paid to the general opinion.  However all will pass – the excise will pass – the 
Bank will pass.  The only corrective of what is corrupt in our present form of government will be the 
augmentation of the numbers in the lower house, so as to get a more agricultural representation, which may 
put that interest above that of the stock-jobbers.”65 
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Here, Jefferson made two rather striking assertions.  First, he stumbled in declaring “these 
measures” (the Bank among others) to be wrong in the abstract, and decided to leave it up to 
public opinion, which the government should listen to more.  Here is a man who has been 
shouting about the Bank’s unconstitutionality, along with Madison, in the fervent months leading 
up to the signing of the Bank bill, and now he claims to be unsure of its abstract legitimacy.  
 Secondly, Jefferson appeared much more focused not on the Banks’s unconstitutionality 
and how the passage of an unconstitutional bill would corrupt government, but rather on 
government corruption resulting from a disproportionate North-South economic and 
representational divide.  The Bank was a mere symptom of the favoritism that Northerners 
enjoyed over Southerners; it further enriched Northern financiers at the expense of Southern 
agricultural producers.  To call it economically unsound would be to call the entire national 
system economically unsound, which Jefferson would not shy away from doing.  However, this 
would not go over very well with the Northerners who benefitted from such a system.  Although 
Jefferson may not have held these Northerners in high esteem, he must have known that 
Northern opposition to the Bank, in addition to already established Southern criticisms of the 
bill, would build a more convincing argument against the Bank in Washington’s eyes.  Thus, 
alienating the Northern states by only presenting criticisms about how the Bank disparaged the 
South’s economy would not be the best strategy for Jefferson in this sense.  But to take the 
strategy of calling the Bank unconstitutional was to call it so on a federal level, without state 
boundaries.  Even Northerners could have been expected to look down upon an attack on the 
Constitution or to fear an overreaching federal government.  Thus, it is reasonable to infer how 
Jefferson may have used the claim of the Bank’s unconstitutionality as an instrumental means 
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that would both prevent its passage and eliminate an obstacle to the South’s economy, and it 
would do so by drawing in Northern criticisms of the Bank as well.  
  In a sense, Jefferson very subtly gave himself away in this letter to Mason.  On the 
surface, his concerns with how the Bank would contribute to North-South inequalities might 
have seemed to be secondary concerns, especially when placed in the context of government 
corruption, which he outwardly claimed would result particularly from the passage of an 
unconstitutional bill.  Yet this is an inverted perception of the meaning of Jefferson’s words.  The 
North-South economic disparities were Jefferson’s primary concern (as will be shown below), 
and the Bank’s unconstitutionality was only secondary – useful as a criticism in as much as it 
would relieve economic government favoritism toward the North at the expense of the South. 
 Continuing through Jefferson’s 1791 correspondence, it becomes obvious that his letters 
to Madison were just as concerned with economic issues as Madison’s were to him.  Nowhere in 
these letters was the question of constitutionality brought to the forefront of discussion.  In July, 
Jefferson wrote, “I inclose you a paper estimating the shares of the Bank,” and explained that 
“many persons [have been] left in the lurch.”66  Later the same month he told Madison of Bank 
“subscriptions from Virginia,” and how the Bank had “filled and overflowed.”67  In fact, unlike 
Madison who seemed to voice economic disapproval of the Bank only in his correspondence 
with Jefferson, Jefferson shared economic concerns with other people as well a few months after 
the bill’s passage.  To James Monroe he wrote in April,  
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“Now schemes are on foot for bringing more paper to market by encouraging great manufacturing 
companies to form, and their actions, or paper-shares, to be transferrable as bank-stock.  We are ruined, Sir, 
if we do not over rule the principles that ‘the more we owe, the more prosperous we shall be.’”68 
   
To Edmund Pendleton, Jefferson wrote in July about a “delirium of speculation.”69  He evidently 
had mostly economic concerns on his mind regarding the Bank, with literally no mention of its 
unconstitutionality. 
 Of course, none of this is surprising given that Madison and Jefferson always had truly 
serious economic concerns with the Bank bill, and they had always voiced these concerns.  The 
peculiarity of the situation involving their correspondence is that they voiced constitutional 
concerns more loudly in the criticisms of the Bank that they presented to Washington, for 
example when he asked for his cabinet to write opinions on the subject.  Suddenly, as soon as the 
Bill passed, these legal concerns fell by the wayside, or at least they seemed to judging by the 
correspondence record.  The implication is that the Bank’s unconstitutionality was only a legal 
tool in preventing its passage, and not Madison and Jefferson’s major concern with the bill.  This 
concern was economic.   
 
February 8th Speech to Congress 
 Madison’s speeches to Congress leading up to the Bank’s passing offer more evidence of 
the fact that his primary concern with the Bank was economic and not constitutional.  At first this 
statement appears counterintuitive.  After all, he made two speeches to Congress regarding the 
National Bank on February 2nd and February 8th, and they both heavily focused on the Bank’s 
unconstitutionality.  The beginning of the Feb. 2nd Speech revolved around the economic 
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deficiencies of the Bank bill.  This is not surprising even if one is to believe that economic 
concerns were secondary in Madison’s opposition since he was always vocal about having these 
concerns in the background of the constitutional debate.  Then, most of the Feb. 2nd Speech 
turned to proving that the bill was indeed unconstitutional, based on the fact that the Constitution 
did not grant Congress any express power to incorporate a Bank.70   
 The Speech on Feb. 8th started in much the same way as the one on Feb. 2nd finished, and 
Madison once more outlined the unconstitutionality of the Bank bill.  Toward the end of the Feb. 
8th Speech however, Madison’s words took an unexpected turn.  He turned once more to 
economic problems with the Bank.  Thus, Madison began and ended his vocal opposition to the 
Bank in front of Congress with economic criticisms. The impression he started with was 
economic, and the Congressmen would leave the assembly having last heard more economic 
considerations.  Constitutional arguments, though taking up far more time than economic, were 
sandwiched between economic arguments.  This was curious to say the least.  Why would 
Madison not prefer that Congress leave the speech with constitutional concerns freshly in their 
minds instead of critical economic snippets thrown into the Speech at the end?71 
 However, to say the structure of the Speeches gives weight to the idea that Madison’s 
primary concerns were economic would be a matter of opinion, however valid.  It was an actual 
passage he uttered to conclude the Feb. 8th Speech, which draws the most suspicion about his 
emphasis of constitutional issues.  After spending almost 5,000 words documenting the 
constitutional abuses perpetrated by the Bank Bill, Madison said the following:   
“There are other defects in the bill, which render it proper and necessary, in my opinion, that it should 
undergo a revision and amendment before it passes into law.  The power vested by the bill in the Executive 
                                                
70 Madison, James. "Speeches in the First Congress." Congress. 2 Feb. 1791. Online Library of 
Liberty. Web. 1 Apr. 2012.   
71 Madison, James. "Speeches in the First Congress." Congress. 8 Feb. 1791. Online Library of 
Liberty. Web. 1 Apr. 2012.   
 38 
to borrow of the Bank, he (Madison) thought was objectionable, and the right to establish subordinate 
banks ought not be delegated to any set of men under Heaven.”72   
 
This quoted passage is surprising in light of what came before it in the Speech.  If the Bill was as 
incontestably unconstitutional as Madison just finished explaining, how in the world could he 
imply that a revision or amendment to a few – seemingly economic – defects would make it 
passable into law?  It seems as though this quoted set of lines was taken from a completely 
different speech on a completely different subject and glued into the Feb. 8th Speech, but indeed 
it was not.  Even more shocking was that Madison would commit such a mistake – for it seems 
to be a grave error in judgment – to abandon a total opposition to the Bank and turn to 
compliance with the bill on the condition that the bill’s granted executive power to borrow 
money be removed.  The only explanation for this utterance might just be that Madison could not 
hold his tongue and leave the floor without stressing his genuine economic qualms.  Maybe he 
did not feel it as necessary to focus as much on constitutionality while addressing Congress as he 
would in addressing Washington, his main audience.  Regardless, the conclusion to the Feb. 8th 
Speech was telling in regards to Madison’s opposition. 
 
Federalist 44 
 A glaring indication that Madison demonstrated inconsistencies in his opposition of the 
Bank also lies in Federalist 44.  During the Bank debate, Madison’s arguments certainly made it 
seem as if his constitutional criticisms were fundamental legal principles that he held in his heart.  
However, as it turns out, these principles were more recent than they were fundamental.   
 A major justification that Hamilton employed to legitimize the Bank’s legality was 
Federalist 44.  The paper was very much legal in scope, and its principal part outlined the 
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meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause.  Federalist 44 described the clause as granting “the 
power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the 
foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this constitution in the government of the 
United States or in any department or officer thereof.”  Federalist 44 further absolutely 
legitimized the clause: “Few parts of the Constitution have been assailed with more 
intemperance than this; yet on a fair investigation of it, as has been shown, no part can appear 
more completely invulnerable.”  The paper continued, “Without the substance of this power, the 
whole Constitution would be a dead letter.  Those who object to the article, therefore, as a part of 
the Constitution, can only mean that the form of the provision is improper.”  
 Thus, Federalist 44 explained exactly what the Necessary and Proper Clause entailed and 
why it was a legitimate and necessary section of the Constitution.  What is most important with 
respect to the National Bank Debate is how Federalist 44 applied the clause to the actual realities 
of the US government.  It read, “No axiom is more clearly established in law, or in reason, than 
that wherever the end is required, the means are authorized; whenever a general power to do a 
thing is given, every particular power necessary for doing it, is included.”73  It is clear now why 
Hamilton would use this assertion as justification for his Bank.  If Congress possessed the 
enumerated power of borrowing money, and borrowing money was in this case a required end, 
the means of incorporating a Bank were authorized, regardless of whether other means to borrow 
were available.  This approval for an “implied powers” constitutional outlook certainly pitted the 
author of Federalist 44 against the enumerated powers proponents in the two-sided divide over 
constitutional interpretation.  The surprise is that the author of Federalist 44 was James Madison. 
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 In fact, many did not even know of Madison’s authorship during the Bank debate.  
Representative Elias Boudinot quoted Federalist 44 during a Congressional meeting, assuming 
Hamilton himself wrote it.  How disconcerting it must have been for Madison to hear his own 
eloquent words used to justify the Bank that he now so fervently opposed without the need to 
twist these words or take them out of context in the least.  It seemed almost as though he had 
written them to apply to situations like the Bank debate in the first place. 
 Of course, Madison attempted to defend himself by explaining that Hamilton had 
stretched his reasoning and exaggerated his intentions.  Madison claimed that he never meant for 
Federalist 44 to apply to an endless chain of implied powers that justified any means to achieve a 
required end.74  But in hindsight, this rings like a hollow qualification, raised when it was 
convenient for Madison to twist his own words in opposing the Bank bill.  Federalist 44 was 
written with a firm and assertive tone, and it meticulously navigated through a set of four 
different scenarios to explain why the Necessary and Proper Clause was worded in the way that 
it was.  These scenarios showed how any other method of including the Clause would have been 
insufficient.  1. Prohibiting the exercise of any Congressional power expressly delegated to it 
would have been too restrictive.  2. Positive enumeration would have been too exhausting as 
would 3. negative enumeration.  4. Lastly, silence on the subject of necessary and proper powers 
on the part of the framers would have given too much authority to the government.75   Madison 
thoroughly explained these minute details, and it seems unlikely that he would not have included 
the qualifications that he later claimed to have intended during the Bank Debate. 
                                                
74 Brookhiser 92-93. 
75 Madison. “Federalist 44.” 
 41 
 Thus it seems that Madison’s fundamental legal ideas were quite consistent with the 
incorporation of the National Bank, even though he claimed they were not.  He must have had 
other, more genuine reasons to oppose it.   
  
Scholars’ Hints 
 Although most scholarship on the National Bank Debate centers around the claim that 
Madison and Jefferson were most concerned with constitutionality, some authors have dropped 
various hints – whether conscious or not – about the true underlying causes of Madison and 
Jefferson’s opposition.  Drew McCoy is one such author.  When he describes Madison’s 
perception of a Hamiltonian constitutional system of interpretation, he does not represent this 
system as necessarily incompatible with American principles but rather as totally incompatible 
with Madisonian principles.  Through this characterization of Madison’s support for a strong 
enumerated powers approach, McCoy places such an approach into a chain of ideas that make up 
the Madisonian vision.  The enumerated powers view becomes instrumental – a means to 
Madison’s ends rather than his actual ends.  Without it, Madison’s vision cannot exist because 
this vision depends on anticorruption.   
 Specifically McCoy describes Madison’s perception of Hamilton’s constitutional doctrine 
as one that sees the doctrine to be “utterly incompatible with limited republican government… 
[a] corrupt, avaricious subversion of the public good.”  By promoting the Hamiltonian doctrine, a 
“minority faction in control of the new federal government had arrogated to itself unlimited 
discretion in determining the scope of its operations.”  Thus the issue of the Bank was only one 
part of a tremendous Madisonian fear of a corrupt government and an avaricious minority that 
would grow into a tyrannical majority.  An implied powers doctrine of interpretation would be a 
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major obstacle to the Madisonian vision for the future for the young republic.  Therefore, any 
constitutional opposition that Madison had to the Bank could be seen as the utilization of the 
Constitution as an instrumental means to achieving his overall political ends – these ends 
centering around anticorruption and a limited government.   
 At the same time, it is undeniable that even a genuine constitutional concern with the 
Bank could also be based on fears of a corrupt central government.  After all, it is not enough to 
say that Madison encouraged an enumerated powers interpretation to avoid unlimited 
government power.  This would not make his calls for the Bank’s unconstitutionality 
disingenuous even if the Constitution were only a means to an end for him (an end of limited 
government).  This situation would prove a legitimate legal concern for Madison.  However, 
what makes Madison’s constitutional claims insincere is that, in this particular context, his 
primary fears of unlimited government were economic fears.  He was not as worried about 
federal tyranny as about economic corruption with respect to the Bank.  This is indicated by his 
writings in Federalist 44.  Hamilton found legal justification for the Bank in Madison’s own 
words in Federalist 44 (“whenever the end is required, the means are authorized”).  If Madison 
feared that such a corporation would lead to government tyranny, he would not have provided a 
legal foundation for such a corporation.  Yet when he saw how one such corporation in 
particular, the Bank, could pose economic threats to his vision for the country, he suddenly 
voiced a strong opposition.  The disingenuousness of this opposition lay in Madison’s 
presentation of his argument.  He hid his economic concerns under the guise of a legal argument.  
He claimed a fear of unlimited government power when he specifically meant economic 
corruption.  When writing Federalist 44, perhaps he had not imagined how a corporation legally 
justified by this document could create economic conditions unfavorable to him.  Thus, he wrote 
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it under a strictly legal mindset since Federalist 44 was a document about legal issues.  Hence, 
legally he was fine with the Bank, but as he would discover later, he had economic qualms.     
 What were these qualms?  An implied powers reading of the Bank bill would legalize and 
contribute to a corporation – in many ways a monopoly –  that “instead of letting manufactures 
grow at their own pace, [would] ruin private ‘natural’ producers and foster dangerous, 
unrepublican disparities in wealth.”  Privileged groups would then become totally dependent on 
the government for sustenance, and this would increase Hamilton’s corrupt influence while 
threatening the American republican government and social structure.76  Here it is clear that the 
“operations” discussed above that Madison feared the government would determine for itself 
were economic operations.  The corruption he feared was Hamilton’s economic corruption on a 
government that would become limitless.  Therefore, according to this interpretation of McCoy, 
even if one is to give some credibility to Madison’s complaints of the Bank’s unconstitutionality, 
these legal constitutional concerns appear as part of a broader Madisonian political-economic 
framework that is incompatible with wealth inequalities and unrepublican ideals.  Once more, his 
primary opposition to the Bank can ultimately be placed in the political-economic realm.     
  Brookhiser further echoes McCoy with his analysis of the Madisonian fears that hinged 
on the Bank bill.  If the government legalized the Bank, “federalism’s slipshod lawmaking would 
‘pave the way to monarchy.’  The President might even ‘regulate’ his successors in office ‘as he 
pleased.’”77  To some, it may seem here that Madison was making robust exaggerations, but to 
him, a National Bank in the Hamiltonian form would bring about such horrors by further 
solidifying the corrupt, conspiratorial Hamilton as someone Washington trusted with lawmaking, 
and an implied powers approach was the stepping-stone for the entire system of corruption to 
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come into effect.  But, again, this stepping-stone was much smaller in scope than the political-
economic system that it would support.  The political-economic system is what would then 
destroy Madison’s ambitions directly.  Constitutionalism’s effect on Madison’s hopes was more 
indirect in this sense – or more secondary. 
 The same could be said for Jefferson in the sense that any true constitutional concerns he 
had with the Bank bill were based on an instrumental utilization of the Constitution to achieve 
his ultimate political-economic vision.  As Staloff explains this time, “In Jefferson’s new 
Romantic politics, principles were not means to ends – they were ends in themselves.”78  These 
ends were republican virtue, North-South equality, and anticorruption.  Instead, the enumerated 
powers approach was the means.  In fact, just as Brookhiser did with Madison, Staloff presents a 
chain of Jeffersonian ideas with an enumerated powers approach as a link in this chain, but not 
the end goal of it.  Jefferson desired participatory democracy, which Staloff explains to require 
strict bounds of the power of the central government.  An enumerated powers approach would 
keep federal power in check and keep the chain together.79  But participatory democracy is the 
end here, not the enumerated powers interpretation itself.   
 Finally, Merrill Peterson makes a remarkable hint at Jefferson’s disingenuousness in 
making constitutional claims about the Bank bill.  He writes, “Jefferson would almost certainly 
not have enunciated such a niggardly view of federal powers had he approved of the Bank as a 
financial institution.”80  Peterson also claims that most alarming for Jefferson was the Bank’s 
charter, not its lack of constitutional legitimacy.  Thus, it is clear that although most scholarship 
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on the National Bank Debate claims Madison and Jefferson’s assertions of unconstitutionality to 
be sincere, some scholars have stepped outside this analytical box in the past century. 
 
Jefferson and the North-South Divide 
 It is likely that, in broad terms, Jefferson’s greatest concern with the Bank was a North-
South ideological and economic divide, as he specified in the correspondence with Mason.  This 
tremendous split between ideologies was in full view during the time of the Bank Debate, and 
Jefferson was the leading voice of the Southern Republicans against Northern commercialism.  
Southerners rallied around Jefferson’s economic perspective that “the world of the early 
Republic ought to belong to people who lived by manual labor and not by their wits” (or 
apparently people who lived by the manual labor of others, whom they owned as slaves).  He 
asserted that cities were dangerous because in them, “men sought ‘to live by their heads rather 
than their hands.’”81  
 James Rogers Sharp presents a fantastic description of the tensions that thus arose 
between the North and the South Jeffersonian Republicans.  “The overwhelmingly rural and 
isolated Southern society, with its plantation economy based on slave labor and its local elite-
controlled institutions, contrasted sharply with New England.”  Therefore, the South did not like 
the puritan North dictating what was an acceptable method of economic gain, particularly when 
the question turned to slavery.  After all, slavery and republicanism were tightly connected in the 
South.  “Slavery … could elevate white citizens of the republic to a level where they would be 
able to be autonomous, independent, and virtuous, qualities that were essential to preserving the 
republic.”  In this sense, the Federalist-Republican divide that would continue to grow out of this 
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North-South tension into a widely perceived difference in party ideology (after about the year 
1792) was not so much party ideology at all, but rather a “manifestation of sectional strife.”  
Jefferson himself characterized the South’s Republican interest as “primarily sectionally 
grounded.”82 
 How did this sectional strife apply to the Bank bill?  The corrupt commercialization of 
the Bank would destroy the very core of a Southern agrarian republic.  Although Jefferson 
espoused the virtue of the virtually incorruptible yeomen of the South, he nonetheless feared a 
National Bank because it could lead to dependence, - a significant republican concern.  
According to Jefferson, “dependence begets subservience and venality, suffocates the germ of 
virtue, and prepares fit tools for the designs of ambition.”  Moreover, the debt created by the 
Bank would compromise personal autonomy and independence.  Meanwhile, the South 
absolutely had to remain autonomous and independent to maintain its way of republican life.  If a 
National Bank imposed government dependence on the Southern part of the Union, Jefferson 
feared commercialism would sweep away the agrarian Southern character and leave only 
corruption and vice.83 
 Consequently, he saw the Bank as sectionally biased.  The context surrounding the Bank 
was one that indicated that the Federal government had become a sort of “court of last resort” 
which had the final voice on such legislative issues, including ones that could hamper the 
economic productivity of the South.  In this sense, the new political system silenced local voices.  
A strong Federal system could work if it acted for the general good of all localities, but was this 
possible when Virginia and Massachusetts had strikingly different conceptions of what the 
general good was?  Now, Virginia and the South had to live with a Bank bill that they absolutely 
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did not approve of, and they could not handle their powerlessness.  As Paul Goodman explains, 
“groups used to getting their way at home were unused to being thwarted in the new arena.”  
Sharp concludes that, “it was particularly easy for the Virginians, as residents of the largest and 
most powerful state, to conclude [that the ‘general welfare’ was being sacrificed to faction].”84  
And Jefferson spoke for these Virginians.  Therefore as a champion for this cause and a fervent 
supporter of the idea that the South was constantly put at a disadvantage by federal policies that 
favored the Northern economy – especially in light of the mentioned reasons to believe 
Jefferson’s constitutional claims against the Bank were insincere – it is reasonable to say that 
Jefferson’s gravest concern with the Bank was that it further promoted an unfair North-South 
divide. 
  
Washington as an Audience 
 Realistically, it would be much more plausible that Madison and Jefferson utilized 
constitutional arguments against the Bank as a legal ploy, when they had other primary concerns, 
if there was a reasonable motive for them to do so.  As a matter of fact, there was, and it had to 
do with their audience.  Although the Bank bill initially lay in the hands of and was then passed 
by Congress, the decision ultimately lay in the hands of the President under the power of the 
Presidential Veto.  In calling the Bank bill unconstitutional, Madison and Jefferson would 
arguably trigger a bigger red flag for Washington than by simply calling the bill economically 
unsound.  Under this pretext, Washington faced the threat of not merely signing an unsound bill 
into law but an illegal one that might reflect disastrously on his reputation.  Furthermore, 
Washington’s previous disposition toward Madison and Hamilton made it likelier that he would 
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trust Madison more with legal concerns and Hamilton more with economic ideas.  Finally, 
Washington would not be very keen in taking Jefferson’s concerns with sectional strife into 
account.     
 Elected as President in 1789, George Washington was a man intensely devoted to the 
Constitution if for no other reason than to assuage public fears of a monarchical leader – much 
like the one in Britain – that snubbed national law.  In one sense, much of the nation already had 
a favorable attitude toward Washington that precluded any suspicions that he would take 
unlimited control of the government and turn it into a monarchy.  Gordon Wood explains, 
“Washington’s unanimous election as President was preordained.  He was the only person in the 
country who automatically commanded the allegiance of all the people.  He was probably the 
only American who possessed the dignity, patience, restraint, and reputation for republican 
virtue…”  He had always resisted any temptation to become a quasi-King or dictator (as some 
even wished that he might) and, even in his days of military glory, had always respected civilian 
superiority over army power.  In fact, after rising to the status of national hero after his gallantry 
in the Revolutionary War, Washington promised to forego “any share in public business 
hereafter.”  Wood describes the groundbreaking significance of this promise:  “This self-
conscious retirement from public life had electrified the world.  All previous victorious generals 
in modern times – Cromwell, William of Orange, Marlborough – had sought political rewards… 
But not Washington.  He seemed to epitomize public virtue and the proper character of a 
republican leader.”85   
 Yet as history holds, Washington did not keep his promise and would become the first 
President of the United States a few years later.  There he found himself in a peculiar and tense 
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position.  Although the nation held him in high esteem and trusted his lack of interest in seizing 
monarchical power, they could not have trusted his successors to be as selfless.  Every day, 
Washington confronted public sentiment that wavered between proclaiming him a “King, under 
a different name,” (as soon to be Secretary of War, James MacHenry said) and begging him not 
to be a King so that the next line of Presidents would not abuse the title.  Washington grew 
extremely eager to cast away any doubt of his lack of interest in excessive political power.  He 
tried to refuse a Presidential salary and emphasized his distaste for office.86  He also understood 
that precedent was all-important.  Washington asserted, “many things which appear of little 
importance in themselves and at the beginning, may have great and durable consequences for 
their having been established at the commencement of a new general Government.”  The 
position of President had to be thus confined that even men who were not as honorable as 
Washington would not have the ability to turn it into a dictatorship in the future.87   
 Thus, it would be reasonable for Madison and Jefferson to predict that a constitutional 
argument would make Washington much more cautious in considering the Bank bill.  The 
President would be meticulously aware of the danger in acting contrarily to the Constitution and 
thereby exercising excessive executive power in an unrestricted, monarchical fashion.  For a man 
with such a strong determination to avoid any abuse of political power and to demonstrate the 
utmost loyalty to national law and power restrictions, risking an unconstitutional action was 
equivalent to playing with fire.  
 For Madison and Jefferson, these expectations of Washington’s political fears and 
leanings would have been confirmed with his frequent proclamations of a fierce loyalty to the 
Constitution.  In a way, Washington’s national standing was intimately tied with the 
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Constitution.  Sharp explains that “despite the Antifederalists’ strenuous opposition and deep 
apprehensions, the Constitution had been ratified, perhaps in large part due to the popular 
perception that Washington would consent to be the first President.”88  Now that he was indeed 
President, Washington would not break his allegiance to the document.  The President’s personal 
correspondences and Congressional speeches provide evidence of this fact.  To Attorney-General 
Edmund Randolph he wrote in 1790, “the Constitution of the United States and the laws made 
under it must mark the line of my official conduct.”89  In 1791, just before the signing the Bank 
bill, Washington asked Hamilton to write a report outlining his argument for the Bank’s 
constitutionality.  Clearly, the matter was important to the President: “The constitutionality of 
[the Bank] is objected.  It therefore becomes more particularly my duty to examine the ground on 
which the objection is built.”90  It was Washington’s “duty” to evaluate constitutional objections, 
and his duty overall to defend the Constitution. 
 Later in 1791, Washington made a speech to Congress, once more greatly exalting the 
qualities of the Constitution.  He spoke of the “happy effects of that revival of confidence, public 
as well as private, to which the Constitution and laws of the US have so eminently contributed.”  
He followed with the following assertion: “It is desirable, on all occasions, to unite with a steady 
and firm adherence to constitutional and necessary acts of government.”91  Writing to Hamilton 
again in September of 1792, Washington remained steadfast in his loyalty to the document:  “the 
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Constitution and laws must strictly govern…”92  Finally, Washington’s correspondence indicated 
that he also valued loyalty to the Constitution from others.  In a private letter, he reassured his 
recipient that he acknowledged this person’s constitutional commitment: “I did not require the 
evidence of the extracts, which you enclosed to me, to convince me of your attachment to the 
Constitution of the United States, or of your disposition to promote the general welfare of this 
country.”93  It may be inferred here that Washington even equates a constitutional loyalty to 
promoting the general welfare of the US, placing his opinion of the Constitution on a very high 
tier of priorities.  If Madison and Jefferson knew about Washington’s strong adherence to and 
praise for the Constitution – and they certainly did as they interacted with the President often – 
they must have felt that a constitutional argument against the Bank would most catch 
Washington’s attention and, they must have hoped, his rejection.  
 Moreover, Washington’s attitude toward Madison and Hamilton respectively, along with 
Madison’s perception of Washington himself, would have prompted Madison’s eagerness to 
engage Hamilton in a constitutional battle rather than an economic one.  Madison and 
Washington had become good friends prior to Washington’s ascension to the Presidency.  In 
1785, they had grown very close over the chartering of the Potomac River Company when 
Washington described Madison’s judgment as “the best guide” on the matter.94  As Washington 
began his Presidency, Madison had the opportunity to return the favor by praising his new leader 
and firmly proclaiming his trust in him.  While many feared a monarch in the form of a 
                                                
92 Washington, George. Letter to Alexander Hamilton. 16 Sept. 1792. The Writings of George 
Washington. By Worthington Chauncey Ford. N.p.: n.p., n.d. N. pag. Online Library of 
Liberty. Web. 1 Apr. 2012 
93 Washington, George. Private Letter. 18 Oct. 1792. The Writings of George Washington. By 
Worthington Chauncey Ford. N.p.: n.p., n.d. N. pag. Online Library of Liberty. Web. 1 
Apr. 2012 
94 Brookhiser 44-45. 
 52 
President, Madison saw Washington as totally faithful to the law.  Wood explains, “Trusting 
Washington as he did, Madison … brought the members of the House around to accepting the 
idea of a strong and independent President, one who had full responsibility for seeing that the 
laws were faithfully executed.”95  Approximately two years later, during the National Bank 
Debate, Madison still saw Washington as a patriot who adhered to the Constitution according to 
his duty.  More importantly, Washington now thought the same of Madison, for whom he had an 
“immense respect.”  In fact, Washington now regarded Madison as the “leading light on the 
Constitution.”96  Therein lay the key for Madison’s strategy in opposing the Bank, for if Madison 
was the constitutional expert and claimed the Bank to be unconstitutional, Washington would 
likely be swayed by this assertion. 
 It is worth mentioning that not only was the constitutional argument more promising for 
Madison in this regard, but the economic argument was also likely to fail.  When Congress had 
created the National Treasury Department, it made no mention of the President regulating the 
department’s powers.  Instead, the Secretary of the Treasury would report directly to Congress.  
As a result, wishing to respect the desire of the legislature, Washington typically abstained from 
interfering with Hamilton’s affairs.  He was much less likely to encroach on Hamilton’s 
economic plans than he was to meddle in the business of his other cabinet members.97  Madison 
may not have felt as confident in asking Washington to oppose Hamilton’s economic ideas as in 
asking Washington to consider Madison’s own constitutional concerns.  Yet he did not envision 
that Hamilton’s response to Madison and Jefferson’s opposition to the Bank would be enough to 
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overturn legal criticisms while affirming the economic principles over which Washington gave 
Hamilton free rein as usual. 
 Finally, it is likely that Jefferson also felt that his best argument against the Bank with 
Washington as his audience was the constitutional one because his greatest economic concern – 
the Bank’s contribution to federal favoritism toward the Northern economy over Southern 
agriculture – would have made little impact on the President.  In his inaugural address, 
Washington “pleaded for unity, beseeching Congress to shed ‘local prejudice or attachments,’ to 
hold ‘not separate views,’ and to avoid ‘party animosities.’”  With this statement and later 
assertions, Washington firmly placed himself “above petty personal, local, and sectional 
interests.”  In addition to disliking having to deal with sectional strife, Washington preferred to 
act as though it did not exist, at least not to the extent that ruthlessly plagued Jefferson.  During a 
1791 trip through the South, Washington said, “tranquility reigns among the [Southern] people, 
with that disposition towards the general government which is likely to preserve it.”98  This 
perspective came into sharp contrast with Jefferson’s perception of a victimized South, 
abandoned by the federal government in favor of corrupt Northern financiers and manufacturers.  
Consequently, an argument targeting the sectional disparities that would result from the National 
Bank would not seem likely to be effective for Jefferson in presenting his arguments to 
Washington.  The most promising plan for Madison and Jefferson remained the constitutional 
argument even if it was not their most sincere or significant one.              
 
Conclusion 
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 As debates over legislative constitutionality continue today, we see that the tradition of 
legal constitutional supremacy lies in the 1790s National Bank Debate.  Madison and Jefferson 
voiced a strong opposition against Hamilton’s Bank, which the Secretary of the Treasury 
believed would strengthen and improve the American economy.  Most historians and scholars 
today attribute Madison and Jefferson’s criticisms of the bill to their belief that it was 
unconstitutional.  However, this view is incorrect in light of evidence such as Madison and 
Jefferson’s correspondences, economic beliefs, and previous legal writings.  In fact, it is a 
likelier story that Madison and Jefferson chose the argument of unconstitutionality as a legal 
ploy to convince President Washington to veto to the Bank bill.  In the end, however, he sided 
with Hamilton.   
 The National Bank Debate thus serves as a symbol of a false tradition.  The idea that 
government officials cared passionately and deeply for the Constitution as a supreme source of 
legal authority was ingrained in American ideology at least in part because of the constitutional 
claims Madison and Jefferson made in this debate.  If they were insincere, this historical event is 
just as much a mark of deception as it is of tradition.  Hence it is important for today’s American 
politicians and citizens to take a more critical look into history and present times alike.    
 Various political groups throughout the nation currently take a firm stance against 
judicial activism, and this is clearly evident in the case against President Obama’s national health 
care reform bill.  Many urge the Supreme Court to strike down the bill if it finds it 
unconstitutional even if the justices personally support Obama’s policy.  The idea of twisting the 
meaning of the Constitution to fit one’s personal political motivations is certainly frowned upon 
in American society.  Meanwhile, politicians and scholars call for meticulous examination of the 
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American Founders’ intentions in writing the Constitution in order to ensure that today’s leaders 
will not get away with misreading the document for their personal gain.   
 Yet what this study uncovers and solidifies is that our Founding Fathers engaged in this 
less-than-admirable practice of intentional constitutional misinterpretation themselves.  In this 
sense, they were not more dishonest than today’s politicians, but they also were not the shining 
beacon of honesty that many consider them to have been.  Judicial activism and intentional 
constitutional misinterpretation may be troubling and legally harmful in themselves.  But 
Americans should start analyzing such actions on their own terms instead of begrudging the 
judicial or executive activist because he/she breaks with the traditions established by the 
Founders.  These traditions – the fundamental constitutional core of American society – were 
just as swamped in disingenuousness, as exemplified by Madison and Jefferson’s opposition to 
the National Bank in 1791.  Let us look to history and not only learn honesty and working for the 
collective American good, but also how to avoid political deception and personal gain, for there 
was plenty of that during the American founding as well.  
 Indeed, if we take the National Bank Debate into consideration, we can see that the 
Constitution was used as a political tool from its very creation.  It served as a smokescreen even 
for the Founders in their quests to achieve their personal political goals.  Americans frequently 
contrast the nation today with the US of the late eighteenth century and claim that, as a country, 
we have forgotten the true meaning of the Constitution – that we have disobeyed the authority of 
the Founders.  Yet this study shows that the Founders were in the business of masking the 
Constitution’s true meaning themselves, whenever it suited their ambitions.   
 
